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NOTE
Construction Lending: The Mortgagee's
Right to Inspect the Construction Project
and Duty to Ensure Proper Disbursement
of Construction Loan Proceeds
INTRODUCTION
A mortgagee' enters into a loan agreement with a mortgagor 2 to
provide the construction financing for a shopping mall. The mortgagor'
contractor commences construction on the project as soon as the loan transac-
tion is closed. The mortgagee disburses the loan proceeds directly to the
contractor as draw requests are made and construction progresses on the mall.
The mortgagee also monitors the progress of the shopping mall by making
penodic inspections of the project.
During the course of the construction, two different problems can arise
for which the mortgagor may claim the mortgagee is liable. A quantity
defect3 arises if the construction loan fund is exhausted before the shopping
mall is complete. A quality defect 4 on the other hand, occurs if the shopping
The terms "mortgagee" and "lender" are used interchangeably hn this Note. Both refer to the
financial institution that provides the construction financing secured by a mortgage on the property.
2 The terms "mortgagor" and "borrower" are used interchangeably in this Note. Both represent
the entity or individual that has received the construction mortgage loan from the mortgagee and that
has pledged the property as security for the debt.
'The borrower's allegation in Gartbsh v. Malvern Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 517 A.2d 547, 550
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), illustrates a quantity defect. The savings and loan institution was accused of
violating its fiduciary duty to the borrower for disbusing ninety percent of the construction loan
proceeds while only forty percent of the project was completed. See also Daniels v. Big Horn Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 P.2d 1046, 1047 (Wyo. 1980) (where the builder "walked off the job leaving
an unfinished house and unpaid bills").
' An example of a quality defect is found in Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 262
S.E.2d 230, 231 (Ga. Ct App. 1979), in which the mortgagor alleged that the mortgagee was liable
for construction work that was poorly performed and not in accordance with the building's plans and
specifications. See also Clark v. Kansas Say. & Loan Ass'n, 608 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (rooms not built to specified dimenstons); Davis v. Nevada Nat'l Bank 737 P.2d 503, 505
(Nev. 1987) (unworkmanlike and defictent construction); Roundtree Villas Ass'nv. 4701 Kings Corp.,
321 S.E.2d 46, 48 (S.C. 1984) (borrower claimed lender was liable for defects in the construction of
roofs and balconies).
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mall has severe structural deficiencies. Either type of defect in the construc-
tion project might require a substantial sum of money to remedy.
Borrowers' claims or counterclaims against construction lenders are
commonplace in today's depressed and litigious real estate development
industry. This Note addresses two of the possible construction lender liability
issues relating to the preceding shopping mall scenario:5 (1) the legal
consequences of the mortgagee's periodic inspection of the construction
project's progress and (2) the legal obligations created when the mortgagee
disburses the loan proceeds directly to the general contractor.6
Part I of this Note analyzes the legal theories the borrower may rely on
to hold the lender liable for quantity or quality defects in the construction
project or for the improper disbursement of construction loan proceeds. Part
II of thns Note discusses lender liability based on the mortgagee's right to
inspect the construction project 8 Part Im addresses the issue of lender liability
based on the mortgagee's disbursement of funds directly to the contractor?
Part IV suggests several safeguards the mortgagee might use to protect itself
from liability should either of the considered issues in Parts II and IHl anse.'0
This Note concludes by recommending against the imposition upon a
lender of an additional duty or higher standard of care to inspect the
construction project or to ensure defect-free construction when the lender
disburses the loan proceeds directly to the builder, rather than to the borrower.
' This Note focuses on the extent of the lender's liability to the borrower for quantity and
quality defects that may arise during the construction phase of the project. Lenders' liability to third
parties who are not part of the debtor-creditor relationslp, such as contractors, subcontractors,
materialmen or suppliers, is beyond the scope of this Note. Likewise, this Note will not attempt to
address a lender's liability for financing the purchase of an existing building or home that may have
preexisting structural defects. For a general discussion of this latter issue, see Craig R. Thorstenson,
Note, Mortgage Lender Liability to the Purduhsera of New or Existng Homes, I U. ILL. L. Ra. 191
(1988) (arguing that mortgage lenders should be held liable for failing to disclose relevant
information to borrowers who are purchasing new or existing homes).
6 Ordinarily, the mortgagee has no implied contractual or tort duty to third parties who are not
parties to the construction loan agreement. See Comet Dev. Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 579 So. 2d
355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (if mortgagee owed any duty to disburse the loan funds with
reasonable care, it was owed to the owner of the building and not to the contractor);
Stncldand-Collins Constr. v. Barnett Bank, 545 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
that the lender's duty to disburse the loan funds was owed to the borrower and not to the general
contractor); Equitable Mortgage Resources, Inc. v. Carter, 406 S.E.2d 494, 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that construction lender owed no duty to subcontractor regarding disbursement of loan
proceeds); Light v. Equitable Mortgage Resources, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 142, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(recognizing that construction lender has no duty "to protect the subcontractors from the risks of
doing business with its borrower"); cf. National Bank v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 41 (Wash.
1973) ("Outside the contract, the major duty which a construction lender owes to any other party is
the duty of good faith; though a loan may be inefficiently managed and with adverse consequences,
neither inferior lienors nor absolute guarantors have any recourse against the lender unless it is
alleged and proved that the lender acted in bad faith.").
7 See mnfi notes 11-44 and accompanying text.
'See nfira notes 45-78 and accompanying text.
'See fira notes 79-137 and accompanying text.
,9See mfra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
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Early m the trial process, courts should dispense with claims that frivolously
attempt to establish the existence of an additional duty or higher standard of
care on the lender's part.
I. LEGAL THEORIES USED TO IMPOSE UPON THE LENDER A DUTY
TO ENSURE PROPER APPLICATION OF CONSTRUCTION LOAN PROCEEDS
Borrowers have used several legal theories in attempts to impose upon
lenders a duty to ensure the proper application of construction loan proceeds
or to protect the borrower from quantity or quality defects in construction
projects." While establishing the existence of such a duty is the borrower's
initial hurdle, it should be noted that even if a duty is umposed upon or
assumed by the lender, and it is determined that this duty was breached, the
borrower must ordinarily prove in addition that the breach was the proximate
cause of the resultant quantity or quality defect.'2 Only then will the lender
be held liable for the improper or negligent disbursement of the construction
loan proceeds.
The following theories have been used by borrowers in their attempts to
establish that the lender had a duty to inspect the project and/or ensure proper
application of the loan proceeds. Whether these theories have merit depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case. In addition, an important, but not
conclusive, factor is the amount of control the lender exercises over the
borrower and the construction project.
A. The Mortgagee Has a Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care n Adminsterng
Construcion Loan Proceeds
A few jurisdictions impose upon the lender a duty to use reasonable or
due care in disbursing the construction loan proceeds. 3 Florida is one
" A detailed analysis of each of these theories is beyond the scope of this Note. A brief
discussion of several theories of lender liability is presented in this part of the Note. In addition, it
is important to note that in most jurisdictions a duty of good faith is nposed upon the lender in
perforing its contractual obligations; such a duty, however, generally "does not obligate a lender
to take affirmative actions that the lender is clearly not required to take under its loan documents."
Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). See also Wooden v. First
Sec. Bank, 822 P.2d 995, 998 (Idaho 1991) (limiting scope of covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to obligations unposed by parties' agreement). But see Nance v. Resolution Trust Corp., 803 S.W.2d
323, 332-33 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lovell v. Western Nat'lLife Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 298, 302
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988)) (holding that in Texas no duty of good faith and fair dealing is imposed unless
created by express language in contract or special relationship of trust and confidence between
parties; finding the lender-borrower relationship not to be such a special relationship).
" The key to proving that the lender's action or nonaction was the proximate cause is "the
foreseeability of the ultimate mjury as a natural and probable consequence of the act or onssion."
Crum v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 552 N.E.2d 823, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); see also Bollinger v.
Livingston State Bank and Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784, 786 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (the breach must be
the proximate cause of the injury, and it must also be true "that the injury actually was suffered and
is compensable").
" See Fikes v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251, 261 (Alaska 1975) (lender has "a
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jurisdiction that has held that the mortgagee has a "duty to use
reasonable care to see that the funds advanced are used to pay for the
materials and supplies and work done" on the construction project.
14
The same Florida court, however, had previously recognized that the
lender has no duty to supervise the development or to see to the
proper completion of the construction project it finances. 5
Most courts are reluctant to impose upon the lender a duty to use
reasonable care in inspecting the project or in disbursing the loan
proceeds to the borrower based solely on the lender's reservation of
the right to inspect the project. 6 Where the lender disburses the loan
proceeds directly to the builder, however, certain authorities have held
that a higher duty to the borrower may arise. 7 Furthermore, should
the lender insist on this method of disbursement and not obtain the
borrower's prior or joint approval of each payment, some jurisdictions
will definitely impose a fiduciary duty upon the lender to ensure the
proper application of the construction loan proceeds. 8
B. The Mortgagee Owes a Fiduciary Duty to the Mortgagor Because
of an Implied Agency Relationship
Certain jurisdictions adhere to the principle that a mortgagee that
controls the disbursement of the construction loan proceeds and pays
the builder directly is an implied agent of the mortgagor.9 These
duty to admrmster [loan proceeds] in a conventional manner, with due care'); Security & Inv. Corp.
v. Droege, 529 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) ("mortgagee assumes the duty to use
reasonable care to see that the funds advanced are used to pay for the materials and supplies and
work done on the job'); Cook v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 346 So. 2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1977)
(lender should use "reasonable diligence to see that [loan proceeds are] actually used in payment of
materials or other costs of construction"). But see Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d
540, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("lender owes no duty to others to supervise the construction and
development of projects which [mortgagee] has financed'); Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
262 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) ("the lender has no legal duty to protect purchasers from
construction defects when [lender's] activity does not extend beyond that of a conventional
construction lender'); Commeral Nat'l Bank v. Audubon Meadow Partnership, 566 So. 2d 1136,
1139-40 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (lender does not owe duty to guarantors of construction loan to
investigate or analyze the feasibility of construction project); Davis v. Nevada Nat'lBank, 737 P.2d
503, 506 (Nev. 1987) (usually no duty to exercise care in identifying unworkmanlike construction
or to accede to borrower's request to withhold payment from contractor for mnnor deficiencies);
Goodner v. Lawson, 232 S.W.2d 587, 590-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (no duty to protect against liens
when disbursing directly to contractor).
' Droege, 529 So. 2d at 802.
,Armetta, 359 So. 2d at 543.
'e See mfra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
' See mfira notes 19-22, 75-76, 112-29 and accompanying text. But see mfia notes 82-111 and
accompanying text.
' See mfra notes 19-21, 118-29 and accompanying text.
,In Tokatz v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982),
the court identified four
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jurisdictions have held that a fiduciary duty arises on the part of the
mortgagee as a result of the agency relationship. One court stated that
the mortgagee's "conduct must be measured against the standard of
care owed by a fiduciary "20
Generally, the fiduciary theory has been successfully alleged only
where the mortgagee expressly stated or agreed that it would control
disbursement and pay the builder directly without the borrower's joint
participation or approval.2 Two jurisdictions, however, have im-
posed such a duty based solely on the mortgagee's control over the
disbursement of the loan funds, regardless of the extent of the
borrower's participation.2 The fiduciary theory has also been
invoked, albeit unsuccessfully, where the lender has exercised its
contractual right to periodically inspect the project.'
special circumstances which may impose a fiduciary duty [:] [if the lender] (1) took
on any extra services on behalf of [the borrowers] other than furmshing the money for
construction .; (2) received any greater economic benefit from the transaction other than
the normal mortgage; (3) exercised extensive control over the construction; or (4) was
asked by [the borrowers] if there were any lien actions pending.
Id. (citation omitted). Other junsdictions have held that the duties owed to the mortgagor are the
duties of an agent and of a fiduciary. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1117, 1124-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (mortgagee had a fiduciary duty to mortgagor ansing from an
express agreement, custom and practice in the real estate industry, and the existence of a pnncrpal-
agent relationship); Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784, 787 (La. Ct.
App. 1966) (fiduciary relationship arose where bank undertook "to advance money and supervise
construction as to quality and quantity as the agent of [mortgagor]" and where bank possessed the
mortgage note and building contract); M.S.M. Corp. v. Knutson Co., 167 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn.
1969) (fiduciary relationship arose where mortgagee undertook to disburse funds for mortgagor under
the construction contract); Garbish v. Malvern Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 517 A.2d 547, 553 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) (fiduciary duty arose where lender insisted on disbursing construction funds without
borrower's participation and where lender held itself out as an expert in such disbursement); see also
mfra notes 108-27 and accompanying text. But see Wooden v. First Sec. Bank, 882 P.2d 995, 997-98
(Idaho 1991) (finding the construction loan agreement did "not impose any duty, fiduciary or
otherwise, upon the bank to supervise the disposition of the loan proceeds"); Crum v. AVCO Fin.
Servs., 552 N.E.2d 823, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), discussed =fra notes 101-11 and accompanying
text; Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 533 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1992) (recognizing the
general rule that "the relationslp between a bank and its customer does not ordinarily impose a
fiduciary duty on the bank'); Gardner Plumbing, Inc. v. Cottrill, 338 N.E.2d 757, 759-60 (Ohio 1975)
(holding that mortgagee-mortgagor relationship, where mortgagor exercises some control over
disbursement of loan proceeds, does not make mortgagee liable as mortgagoer's agent); Linder v.
Citizens State Bank, 528 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (finding no fiduciary relationship
results from the mortgagee's financing of the mortgagoer's construction).
Garbish, 517 A.2d at 554.
,See Prdential, 369 N.E.2d at 1123-25 (express agreement existed, whereby mortgagee was
mortgagoer's agent, when the mortgagee assured the mortgagor it "would take care of" all liens and
encnmbrances); Garbish, 517 A.2d at 553-54 (lender orally claimed to be an expert in distributing
construction funds and the court held that it would be judged by "the standard of care of an exper").
" See Bollinger, 187 So. 2d at 787; MS.M Corp., 167 N.W.2d at 68; ifra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text.
' See, eg., Clark v. Kansas Say. & Loan Ass'n, 608 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
("makmg of periodic inspections .constitutes normal procedure for [lending institutionr' and does
not impose upon lender a fiduciary duty); see also Thorstenson, supra note 5, at 202-03 (discussing
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C. Mortgagee Holds Construction Loan Proceeds in Trust for the
Mortgagor
Another theory is that the lender holds the loan proceeds in trust for
the borrower. One court has held that the duty of a lender that undertakes
to disburse the loan proceeds directly to the builder is similar to the duty
of a "trustee to hold and disburse funds of a trust estate." 4 The court
held that, like a trustee/agent, the lender "should be held liable to [the
borrower] for a loss due to the neglect of the [lender] to properly conduct
the business undertaken for [the borrower]." The lender, therefore, was
"required to use reasonable care to see that mechanics and materialmen
were paid by the contractor" and "to use ordinary care to protect [the
borrower] from mechanics' liens."'26
Another court's application of the trust fund analogy held that the
lender's duty "was merely to account for the funds belonging to its
borrowers either by showing payment to them or to others for their
benefit and advantage."'27
D. A Duty Arses from an Express Written or Oral Agreement
If the construction loan agreement provides that the lender will
inspect the construction project or disburse the loan proceeds for the
borrower's benefit, the express intention of the parties governs the
debtor-creditor relationshup and obligates the lender to perform any duty
it assumes under the agreement.2 Moreover, if the lender makes oral
representations to the borrower that the lender will perform some task for
liability issues concerning lender inspection provisions for new or existing homes); infra notes 45-78
and accompanying text.
1 Falls Lumber, 181 N.E.2d at 716; see also Sandpiper North Apartments, Ltd. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 680 P.2d 983, 988 (Okla. 1984) (holding that statute incorporating trust fund
doctnne could be invoked to impose liability upon lender that exercsed control over the construction
trust res). But see Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d 230, 231 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)
(refuting borrower's allegation that the lender held the loan proceeds in trust and that under the loan
agreement the lender's inspection of construction progress was for the benefit of the borrower).
"Falls Lumber, 181 N.E.2d at 716.
6Id.
"See Goodner v. Lawson, 232 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950). To show that payment to
others, such as the builder, was for the "borrowers' benefit," the lender need only prove that the
borrowers "consciously consented or agreed for the funds due them to be paid directly to [the third
party]" in order to exempt the lender from possible liability claims. Id. at 590.
n See Wooden v. First Sec. Bank, 822 P.2d 995, 997 (Idaho 1991) ("At common law, a
mortgagee was generally not obligated to protect the interest of a mortgagor. A duty would east only
if there is an agreement creating a duty.") (citations omitted); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive
Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1117, 1123-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that ordinarily the mortgagee
does not contractually obligate itself to inspect the construction of the project or to ensure the proper
application of the loan proceeds; such an arrangement would be contrary to the mortgagee's position
as a lender of funds rather than as an insurer of the mortgagors project, and seldom, if ever, occurs).
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the borrower, these representations may bind the lender' unless the
oral statements are excluded as parol evidence.'
E. The Mortgagee Has an Implied Contractual Duty
The borrower may argue that the lender has an implied contractual
duty One court encountered the implied contract argument where the
lender had made periodic inspections of the construction project.3'
The court was not impressed with the borrower's contention and held
that an implied contract does not arise merely because the lender
makes periodic inspections if the lender's "financing activity does not
extend beyond that of a conventional lender," reasoning that such
inspections are made for the benefit of the lender, not the borrow-
er.32 This ruling illustrates the reluctance of courts to uphold the
implied contractual duty argument where there is contrary or
inconsistent evidence in the written agreement. 3
F The Mortgagee Assumes the Duty
Some borrowers have argued that the lender, by undertaking to
inspect the construction project or by insisting on paying the
third-party builder directly, assumes the duty to perform these
undertakings for the benefit of the borrower.' One court addressed
the assumption of duty theory in regard to a lender that made periodic
" See Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, 181 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (oral representation
made by the lender "to take care of all matters respecting the proper disbursement of the funds"
mposed upon the lender a duty to use "reasonable care" to see that all parties were properly paid and
to use "ordinary care" to protect the borrowers from mechamcs' liens placed on their house); see also
cases cited supra note 21.
' See Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)
(addressing the borrower's claims of oral representations but finding their statements madmissible as
parol evidence); cf. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Cafferty, 571 N.Y.S2d 628, 630 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (excluding parol evidence to alter the contract where a specific disclaimer disallowed
allegations of contrary oral representations).
1, See Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); see
also Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that neither
additional contractual duties nor a separate contract could be implied from bank's "advertisements,
internal policies, pamphlets, and various statements, all of which [were] extrinsic to the loan
agreement").
Butts, 262 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.; cf. Davis v. Nevada Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 503, 505 (Nev. 1987) (Where the lender ignored
the borrower's complaint of substantial construction deficiencies, the court imposed on the lender a
duty implied by law. The lender's liability did not arise "from the loan transaction, but from the
[lender's] later breach of a nonconsensual duty of care n the disbursement of construction loan
proceeds." The duty the lender owed the borrower was not implicit in the contract; rather, it was
implied by law, independent of the contractual relationship.); see also wfra notes 94-100 and
accompanying text.
See Henry v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 459 A.2d 772, 775 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
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inspections of the construction project." In deciding whether the
lender assumed the duty to make quality as well as quantity inspec-
tions for the benefit of the lender, the court cited the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and held that ordinarily no duty to inspect arises
unless the lender assumes such a duty ' For the assumption of duty
theory to work, evidence of some contractual obligation must be
present.3 7 Interpreting the loan agreement, the court found no
evidence that the inspections were undertaken for the benefit of the
borrower. The lender, therefore, did not assume the obligation to
inspect.s
G. A Duty Arises Because the Lender Exerts Excessive Control
over the Borrower
The control theory,39 which underlies the principles of several of
the aforementioned theories, involves the situation in which the lender
exercises excessive control over the borrower, the borrower's business,
or the construction project. Common law theories upon which lenders
have been held liable due to excessive control "include fraud, duress,
interference, bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty " Evidence of
excessive control by the lender over a borrower or a borrower's
business includes the existence of a joint venture relationshlp, 4 a
35 Id.
3' Id. at 775 n.3.
[O]ne who undertakes . for consideration to render services to another which he should
recogmze as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)).
,Id. at 775.
Id. at 775-76.
3' See Wooden v. First Sec. Bank, 822 P.2d 995, 997 (Idaho 1991) (holding that if the lender
exercises complete control over disbursement of the funds, a duty to protect the interests of the
mortgagor may be imposed). For an excellent discussion of the control theory, see generally Marshall
C. Stoddard, Jr., Lyne A. Richardson and David E. Falik, Control Liability For Lenders: Recent
Developments, m CoMmERciAL LAW AND PRACrlCE COURsE HANDBOOK SEMES, LENDER LABILITY
LrroATIoN 1990: REcErr DEVELOPMENTS (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1990).
' See Stoddard, supra note 39, § 2.
" Id. Stoddard defines a joint venture as a "common business undertaking where there is an
agreement or understanding as to sharing profits and the right ofjoint control," although these factors
alone will not constitute ajoint venture. Id. § A(1). Ajoint venture usually will not be found between
the borrower and lender "unless there is a community of interest" between them and the lender is
"too closely intertwined with the business undertakings of the borrower." Because lenders usually
include in the loan agreement language stating in effect that "the relationship between the borrower
and lender shall not be construed as a joint venture, courts often reject the joint venture theory of
liability." Id. See also Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding that there was no joint venture because the lender did not anticipate any profits
or losses "beyond those anticipated as interest charged, on the money loaned").
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principal-agent relationship,42 a fiduciary relationship,43 or lender
control of the borrower's management or finances.
Borrowers have a vast assortment of legal theories and principles on
wich to base their lender liability claims for quantity or quality defects
in the construction project or for misapplication of the construction loan
proceeds. The success of these claims primarily depends upon the specific
facts and circumstances surrounding the dispute. Nevertheless, it is
unportant to recognize the fact that jurisdictions differ as to what
additional duty or standard of care, if any, should be unposed on lenders
in such cases. In determining whether a lender has a duty to inspect the
construction project or a duty to ensure the proper disbursement and
application of loan funds, most jurisdictions perform their analyses on a
case-by-case basis with only minimal guidelines.
H[. THE RIGHT TO INSPECT: THE LENDER'S RIGHT TO MAKE
PERIODIC INSPECTIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND
CONSEQUENT LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS
A construction lender ordinarily includes in its construction loan
agreement a provision allowing the lender to inspect the progress of the
construction project.45 When a construction project encounters quantity
or quality defects,' borrowers have attempted to construe the lender's
contractual right to inspect as a duty to ensure proper application of the
" See Stoddard, supra note 39, § B(I). The article refers to REwrATEErN- (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 14-0 cmt. a (1957), winch addresses when a lender may become a principal for the borrower's
obligations due to excessive control:
[I]f [the lender] takes over the management of the debtor's business either in person or
through an agent, and directs what contracts may or may not be made, he becomes a
principal, liable as any principal for the obligations incurred thereafter in the normal
course of business by the debtor who has now become his general agent. The point at
winch the creditor becomes a principal is that at which he assuMs de facto control over
the conduct of is debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with Ins debtor may
be
Id.; cf. supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing the theory that the lender may become
the implied agent of the creditor in some circumstances).
' See Stoddard, supra note 39, § C(I) ("[Wihere the lender offers financial advice and
counseling, and reliance by the borrower is established, a fiduciary relationship may result"); see also
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text
' See Stoddard, supra note 39, § D ("Lender control issues often anse where loan agreements
include provisions whereby a lender has the right to make financial decisions or influence
management").
,' See, ag., Henry v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 459 A.2d 772, 775 (Pa. Super. Ct 1983)
(provision in loan agreement granted lender "the right to enter the prermses and conduct inspections
'forits own protection"). For cases in winch sunilar provisions were present, see Butts v. Atlanta
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ga. Ct App. 1979); "Goffv. American Say. Ass'n, 561
P.2d 897, 900 (Kan. Ct App. 1977); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (Md. Ct Spec.
App. 1992); Davis v. Nevada Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 503, 505 (Nev. 1987).
" For examples of quantity and quality defects, see supra notes 3.4.
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construction loan proceeds for the completion of a project free of
defects.
47
The main question courts must answer when confronted with such an
allegation is whether the right to rnspect is for the borrower's benefit and
thus imposes upon the lender the duty to monitor the construction project
by making periodic inspections and to ensure proper application of the
loan proceeds.' Most jurisdictions side with the lender on this issue,
holding that the lender's inspections are not for the benefit of the
borrower, but rather are for the lender's benefit.
49
In Henry v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,' a savings and
loan association entered into a construction loan agreement with a
borrower who was having a home built. As construction progressed on
the house, a savings and loan employee conducted approximately six
inspections of the property. Alter the house was completed, the borrower
detected numerous quality defects. The borrower brought an action
against the lender that included breach of contract and negligence
claIns.
51
Under the loan agreement, the lender had the right to enter the
premises and conduct mspections "for its own protection," and the
agreement stipulated that the lender "assumed no responsibility for the
completion of said building according to the plans and specifications."
52
The court held that the clear and unambiguous language of the loan
agreement precluded any finding that the lender had a duty to inspect for
quality of workmanship or for the quantity of work completed before
disbursing the construction loan funds: "[O]rdinarily the law does not
impose a duty upon the mortgagee/lender to inspect the mortgaged
property for the benefit of the mortgagor/borrower, unless the mortgag-
ee/lender has otherwise assumed such a duty.""
To determine the extent of the lender's obligation, the court looked
to the construction loan agreement and found interpretation of the
agreement to be "a question of law for the court' to decide.' The court
was persuaded by the "clear and unambiguous" language of the loan
agreement, which gave the lender the right to inspect for its own benefit
and not as a duty owed for the benefit of the borrower, and affirmed the
lower court's granting of summary judgment for the lender.55
4, See e.g., Butts, 262 S.E.2d at 231-33.
"Id.
"See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
459 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
,Id. at 773-74.
52 Id. at 775.
53 Id. at 774; see also supm notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
4Id. at 775.
11 Id. at 775-76.
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In Light v. Equitable Mortgage Resources, Inc., 6 the borrowers,
who contracted with a developer to construct two homes, brought an
action against the mortgage company that financed the construction
project. The borrowers alleged that the mortgage company had negligent-
ly administered the loan and misappropriated the loan funds. In affirming
the granting of the lender's motion for summary judgment,' the court
reasoned that
[w]here the [lender] undertook no duties for the benefit of the [borrow-
ers] here, the [lender] owed the [borrowers] no duty with regard to the
disbursements of the construction loan proceeds. The contractual
provision giving the [lender] the right to inspect and withhold advances
if it was not satisfied with the progress of construction inured to the
benefit of the [lender], and any failure of the [lender] to exercise that
contractual right provided the [borrowers] no basis for complaint.
Accordingly, the [borrowers] could have no claim against the [lender]
for negligent disbursement of the loan funds.
In so ruling, the court emphasized that the lender "did nothing that it was
unauthorized to do" under the loan agreement signed by the borrowers.'
As Henry and Light indicate, the customary practice of inspection is
ordinarily for the benefit of the lender, not the borrower. Most authorities
appear to follow this same principle.'i
A minority of jurisdictions, including Misslssppl 6i Alaska,62
Minnesota,63 Louisiana"4 and Flonda,' impose some additional duty
383 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. CL App. 1989).
,Id. at 143-44.
Id. (emphasis added).
r' Id. at 144.
See, eg., cases cited supra note 45.
,See Cook v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 346 So. 2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1977) (imposing upon
the construction lender a duty to use reasonable diligence to ensure that funds are actually used to
pay costs of construction).
" See Fikes v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251, 261 (Alaska 1975) (establishing the
lender's duty as one owed to the borrower to administer loan proceeds in a conventional manner and
with due care, including the duty to provide corroborating evidence of expenses incurred conducting
on-site inspections of the project).
" See M.S.M. Corp. v. Knutson Co., 167 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. 1969) (holding that the duty
of the lender is to properly apply and account for all proceeds intended to be expended for the benefit
of the borrower).
" See Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784, 786-87 (La. Ct. App.
1966) (finding that once the bank exercised its right to inspect the project its duty to the homeowner
became that of a fiduciary, and the bank was thereater responsible for supervising construction for
quality and quantity).
" See Comet Dev. Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 579 So. 2d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the obligation of the construction mortgagee is a duty to disburse the funds with
reasonable care for the benefit of the owner); Security & Inv. Corp. v. Droege. 529 So. 2d 799, 802
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1988) (explaining that the nature of a construction loan imposes upon the
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based on the lender's right to inspect. In general, these jurisdictions
recognize the construction lender's affirmative duty to ensure the
proper application of the construction loan proceeds. This line of
reasoning impliedly imposes upon the lender a duty to inspect the
construction project not only for its own benefit but for the borrower's
benefit as well.
Security & Investment Corp. v. Droege," a Florida decision,
illustrates that state's treatment of the right to inspect, and is also
indicative of the Mississippi and Alaska stances on the issue.' The
Droege court found the construction lender's obligation to the
borrower to be as follows: "A construction mortgage is essentially a
mortgage to secure future advances, and the mortgagee assumes the
duty to use reasonable care to see that the funds are used to pay for
the materials and supplies and work done on the job."' This may
imply that in order to fulfill such a duty, the lender should make
periodic inspections of the construction project;69 the court, however,
did not explicitly address this issue.
An earlier Florida decision to some degree contradicts the Droege
holding. In Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors," the court held
that "provisions in the mortgage for inspection by the lender of the
project do not give rise to a duty by the lender to the
purchaser-mortgagor to see that the project is properly construc-
ted."71 Absent any unusual circumstances," such a provision is
"solely for the protection of the lender."73
It is difficult to reconcile the Droege and Armetta holdings
regarding the lender's duty to inspect. What is apparent, however,
under the more recent Droege decision, is that the lender has a duty
mortgagee a duty to use reasonable care in advancing funds to pay for necessary materials and
supplies); Kalbes v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(describing the lender's duty as one owed to the owner and one requiring the exercise of reasonable
care to ensure that payments to contractors are made properly).
"529 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1988).
SSee supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
Id. at 802.
"Periodic inspections by the lender would seem to be the best and perhaps the only way to
properly perform this duty.
359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1978).
7 Id. at 543.
The court cited Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 346 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1977), for the proposition that under certain circumstances "the lender assume[s] complete
control of the developer-borrower's building operations." Armetta, 359 So. 2d at 542. The Annetta
court also distinguished Arneta from Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609,
616 (Cal. 1968), in which "the lender had acted beyond the role of leader and had become an active
participant, along with the developer, in the home construction enterprise." Annetta, 359 So. 2d at
542.
, Annetta, 359 So. 2d at 542.
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to see that the loan proceeds are properly disbursed to pay for the
construction costs. Whether fulfilling this obligation requires periodic
inspections has yet to be determined.'
In Minnesota and Louisiana, the courts have imposed a fiduciary
duty based solely on the lender's control over disbursement of the
loan proceeds.' Other jurisdictions, in certain unusual circumstances,
have imposed a higher duty of care due to the lender's oral representa-
tions to the borrower.' Even without such oral assurances, the duty
to inspect the project for the borrower's benefit has in some cases
been held to be implicit in the lender's obligation to the borrower.'
While most jurisdictions recognize that a lender's right to inspect
is for the benefit of the lender and not for the borrower, a few
jurisdictions seem to imply that such inspections are for the borrow-
er's benefit.78 This determination will in each case depend upon the
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.
III. LIABILITY BASED ON THE LENDER'S DISBURSEMENT OF
CONSTRUCTION LOAN PROCEEDS DIRECTLY TO THE BUILDER
Construction lenders may disburse the construction loan proceeds
to the borrowers, who in turn pay the contractors and suppliers as
progress is made on the construction project. In such cases courts are
generally reluctant to impose any liability upon the lender for
improper application of the construction loan proceeds. 9
Where the lender disburses the construction loan proceeds directly
to the builder without the borrower's joint approval, however, the
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; Bollinger v. Liwngston State Bank and Trust
Co., 187 So. 2d 784, 786 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (The bank assumed the duty to disburse funds without
the prior approval of the borrower. Progress payments were made after inspection of the project by
the bank to assure compliance with the specifications and also to assure that the required quantity
of work had been performed.); M.S.M. Corp. v. Knutson Co., 167 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. 1969)
(finding lender has fiducuary obligation to borrower when it "undertakes to disburse funds for
mortgagor under a construction contract"; lender's duty includes accounting for all funds expended
on behalf of borrower).
" See, e-g., cases cited supra note 21.
77 See supra notes 61-69.
"See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
,See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). In
Prudential, the court recognized that ordinarily .'a mortgagee is not required to protect the interests
of the mortgagor unless an agreement requires him to do so."' Id. at 1123 (quoting 59 CJ.S.
Mortgages § 298 (1949)). "But the mortgagee must place the mortgage proceeds in the hands of the
mortgagor, or at least see they are applied in accordance with the mortgagor's intentions 'andthe
mortgagor may direct or acquiesce in the disbursement of the proceeds of the loan by the
mortgagee."' Id. at 1123-24 (quoting 59 CJ.S. Mortgages § 297 (1949)); see also Wooden v. First
Sec. Bank, 822 P.2d 995, 997 (Idaho 1991); Garbish v. Malvern Fed. Say. & Loan As'n, 517 A.2d
547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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lender may be exposing itself to unwelcome liability if it does not
take certain lending precautions.s' Jurisdictions are split over the
issue of what duties, if any, a lender owes to a borrower when the
lender controls the disbursement of the loan proceeds to the contrac-
tor, a party not subject to the loan agreement."
A. Jurisdictions Reluctant to Impose an Additional Duty upon the
Lender That Disburses Construction Loan Proceeds Directly to the
Builder
Daniels v. Big Horn Federal Savings & Loan Ass z' is helpful
in analyzing the stances various jurisdictions have taken in determin-
ing what additional duty the lender undertakes when it disburses loan
proceeds directly to the contractor. The Danielses,
plaintiffs-borrowers, sued Big Horn Savings & Loan Association for
the negligent disbursement of construction loan proceeds during the
construction of the Danielses' home. Big Horn disbursed the loan
proceeds directly to the general contractor. Prior to the lender's
disbursal of the loan proceeds, Mr. Daniels had signed an acknow-
ledgement form of the list of payments Big Horn was to make. After
the loan proceeds were exhausted but the house only partially
completed, the contractor walked off the job, leaving several unpaid
bills. Another builder completed the house at a substantially increased
cost to the Danielses. The original contractor had been having
financial difficulties, of which the bank was aware.'
The court acknowledged that Big Horn was obligated to disburse
the loan proceeds with due care in order to protect the Danielses.'
The main issues the court considered, however, were whether the
savings and loan owed a higher standard of care to the Danielses and
whether this duty of care was discharged. 5
Finding no Wyoming precedent on the issue, the court looked to
other jurisdictions for help and found a split of authority ' Several
of the jurisdictions consulted had concluded that the lender was
See wfira notes 138-50 (discussing ways in which a lender can protect itself).
"See Daniels v. Big Horn Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 P.2d 1046, 1048-49 (Wyo. 1980)
(basing the decision on a comparison of courts that concluded a duty to the borrower existed and
courts that refused to hold the lender to any special duties arsing from the disbursement of funds
directly to the contractor).
604 P.2d 1046 (Wyo. 1980).
Id. at 1047-48.
U Id. at 1047.
5Id.
" Id. at 1048-49.
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obligated to protect the borrower' interest m the construction project87
Other courts had disagreed.'
After analyzing the other states' decisions, the Danies court held that Big
Horn was not liable for the negligent disbursement of the loan proceeds."
Crucial to this determination was the fact that Big Horn did not expressly
assume through written or oral agreement any duty of care to the borrow-
ers." Furthermore, Big Horn had followed the usual and customary practices
m administering the loan,91 including obtaining the borrowers' prior written
approval of the disbursement procedure.9 The court, finding that the
borrowers had "failed to show what duty of care Big Horn owed," affirmed
summary judgment for the lender. 3
Davis v. Nevada National Bank9' presents a more definitive set of
criteria for determining whether a construction lender should be held liable
for the nusapplication of loan funds. The Davis court listed the following
elements to be considered when deciding whether to hold a lender liable
under a construction loan arrangement:
(1) the lender assumes the responsibility or the right to distribute loan
proceeds to parties other than its borrower during the course of construction;
(2) the lender is apprised by its borrower of substantial deficiencies m
construction that affect the structural integrity of the building; (3) the
borrower requests that the lender withhold further distributions of loan
proceeds pending the satisfactory resolution of the construction deficiency,
(4) the lender continues to distribute loan proceeds m complete disregard of
its borrower's complaints and without any bona fide attempt to ascertain the
truth ofsaid complaints; and (5) the borrower ultimately is damaged because
the substance of the borrowert complaints was accurate and the borrower
is unable to recover damages against the contractor or other party
directly responsible for the construction deficiencies."
Id. The court recognized the following junsdictions' conclusions: Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan As'n, 533 P.2d 251, 261 (Alaska 1975); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369
N.E.2d 1117, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Cook v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 346 So. 2d 370, 372
(Miss. 1977); Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784, 787 (La. Ct. App.
1966); M.S.M. Corp. v. Knutson Co., 167 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. 1969).
a Daniels v. Big Horn Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Wyo. 1980). The court
recognized the following junsdictions' conclusions: Gardner Plumbing, Inc. v. Cottrill, 338 N.E.2d
757, 760 (Ohio 1975); Linder v. Citizens State Bank, 528 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975);
Arnetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1978); Goodner v.
Lawson, 232 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).
,Daniels, 604 P.2d at 1050.
,Id. at 1049-50.
"Id. The court found that it was "unusual for a Wyoming lender to obtain lien wavers before
the project is completed." Id. at 1050.
"Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1050.
737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1987).
"Id. at 506; see also Constnwtion Lender Must Inspect Premises and Stop Payments on
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The borrowers in Davis had instructed the bank to stop makig
payments to the contractor after "serious" construction deficiencies were
discovered. 6 Because the bank retained the funds pending distribution
and distributed the loan proceeds itself, the court held that the lender was
"not totally free to disregard the interests of its borrower."'97
The court stated that a lender normally has no duty to exercise care
in identifymg quality or quantity deficient construction or to accede to a
request by the borrower to withhold payment from a contractor for minor
construction deficiencies. In this case, however, the court held that it
would be "unjust to permit a lender, with impunity, to sunply disregard
a borrower's complaint of substantial construction deficiencies affecting
the structural integnty of a project."'9
The Davis court noted that the bank's liability did not arise from the
loan transaction, but from its later "breach of a nonconsensual duty of
care" in the disbursement of the construction loan proceeds." The bank's
duty was implied by law, independent of the parties' agreement, and
required the bank "to conduct a reasonable investigation" as to the
validity of the borrower's complaint." Davis thus illustrates not only
the general reluctance of courts to impose lender liability based solely on
direct disbursement provisions, but also the willingness of some courts to
do so when certain aggravating factors are present.
Crum v. A VCO Financial Services, Inc.,' is another example of a
court's reluctance to hold a lender liable for negligent disbursement where
the lender controlled the disbursement of the construction loan proceeds.
The Crum court held that a lender who "agrees to disburse loan proceeds
is bound to exercise due care in the performance of thus obligation.
A [m]ortgagee who agrees to apply the proceeds for a certain purpose is
liable for a failure to do so, or negligence in the performance of that
duty."'' Despite finding that the lender had a duty of due care, the
Crum court rejected the borrower's arguments alleging lender liability for
misapplication of the loan proceeds." 3
The borrower pointed to a section of one of the lender's loan
documents entitled "Amounts Paid to Others on Your Behalf" as
evidence of the lender's control over disbursement.'" The borrower
Reque4 Court Says, 49 Banlang Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 25 (July 6, 1987).
"Davis, 737 P.2d at 504-05.
Id.
"Id. at 506.
Id. at 505.
100 Id.
... 552 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
I" Id. at 827.
103 Id.
" Id. at 828.
[Vol. 81
CONSTRUCTION LENDiNG
suggested that the title to tis section meant "amounts paid for your [the
borrower's] benefit." ' 5 The court refuted this contention and found it
was equally likely that the parties intended the phrase to mean "amounts
paid by the lender as the borrower's representative."'"
The borrower also argued that the lender's agreement to disburse the
loan proceeds created an agency relationship between the lender and the
borrower, from which arose a fiduciary relationship that obligated the
lender to act primarily in the borrower's interest.' 7 The court rejected
this argument and stated that "[t]ypically, mortgagees are not agents for
the mortgagor;, they have not undertaken to exercise such power primarily
for the benefit of the mortgagor."'" By looking at the lending
industry's local customary procedures, the court was persuaded that
"controlling the disbursement of loan proceeds [was] undertaken as
a means of protecting the lender, not the borrower."'"
Furthermore, the court held that the existence and breach of a duty
on the lender's part to ensure proper disbursement of the construction loan
did not necessarily give rise to an inference that the lender proximately
caused the borrower's mjury."0 Liability could be found only where the
lender's activity or mactivity was also proven to have proximately caused
the quantity or quality defect."'
B. Jurisdictions That View Direct Disbursement of Loan Proceeds to the
Contractor as a Basis for Imposing a Higher Duty upon the Lender
Two jurisdictions have held that a fiduciary duty arises on the part of
the lender solely because the lender undertakes to disburse the loan
proceeds for the borrower."' In M.S.M. Corp. v. Knutson Co.,"' the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a fiduciary duty falls upon the lender
if it disburses the loan proceeds directly to the contractor.'' The court
found that
the mortgagee has the duty not only to apply all of the proceeds to the
use of the mortgagor without diverting them for unrelated obligations
incurred by contractors or subcontractors, but also to account for all the
,' Id.
'" Id.
,' Id. at 829.
IN Id.
'Id.
.. Id. at 831.
"' Id.
' Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784 (La. Ct. App. 1966);
M.S.M. Corp. v. Knutson Co., 167 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1969).
"IMS.M. Corp., 167 N.W.2d at 68.
,14 Id.
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sums expended on behalf of the mortgagor and to furmsh adequate
proof of the amount paid and the purpose of the disbursement."'
Another court likened the lender's control of disbursement to that of
"a trustee holding and disbursing funds of a trust estate.""6 The court
relied on the general principles of agency law in finding that the lender
had a duty to use reasonable care to ensure that the contractor paid the
suppliers and subcontractors." 7
In Garbish v. Malven Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n," the lender
insisted on distributing the loan funds without providing the borrower any
notice of how and when the funds were distributed."19 The court criticized
this unusual demand and emphasized the lender's duty as an inplied agent for
the borrower.20
The Garbish court based its holding on the fact that the savings and
loan mortgagee exercised exclusive control over disbursing the loan funds
to the builder.' Not only did the mortgagee refuse to allow the
mortgagor any control over disbursement it also claimed to be an expert
m distributing construction loan proceeds.' When approximately
rnety percent of the loan proceeds had been disbursed but only forty
percent of the house was completed, the mortgagor brought suit against
the mortgagee for trespass and assumpsit.'"
The court recognized that to protect the mortgagee from liability, the
"loan funds must actually come into the hands of the mortgagor or his
agent absent some other arrangement between the parties."' 2' Where the
mortgagee controls disbursement the court followed other jurisdictions
that "have found the mortgagee liable for improper disbursement .
absent an express agreement governing the distribution, "on the theory
that the mortgagee became the agent of the mortgagor."'" Because this
"s Id.
"' Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, 181 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (savings association
required mortgagor to permit it to disburse the loan proceeds). See also supra notes 24-27.
II? Id. at 716.
" 517 A.2d 547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
.. Id. at 553.
I" Id.; see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1117, 1124 (Ind. CL
App. 1977) (another unusual case in which the mortgagee orally represented to the mortgagor that
it "would take care of" all liens and encumbrances).
"' Garbish, 517 A.2d at 553.
12 Id.
"2 Id. at 550.
"5 Id. at 551.
I" Id. at 552-53 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1977); Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784 (La. Ct. App. 1966);
M.S.M Corp. v. Knutson Co., 167 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1969); Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, 181
N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961)). But see id. at 551-52 (citing Goodner v. Lawson, 232 S.W.2d 587
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that where mortgagee retained loan proceeds and assumed
responsibility for disbursing them, the mortgagee did not become the agent of the mortgagor "because
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was an agency relationship, the court held that the lender owed the
borrower "a fiduciary duty and its conduct must be measured against the
standard of care owed by a fiduciary."' 26 Moreover, because the lender
represented itself as an expert, it was judged by the lugher standard of
care of an expert fiduciary.27
As the preceding section shows, there is no clear method for
determining the extent of a lender's liability should the lender directly
disburse the loan proceeds to the builder. The crucial factors are the
amount of control exercised by the lender over the disbursement and
whether the lender demanded this control."a Another critical factor is
the extent of the borrower's involvement in approving each of the
builder's draw requests.'"
Jurisdictions are split over these issues. Some jurisdictions are
reluctant to impose liability,"s while others are not.' In Davis v.
Nevada National Bank,"*a a five-prong test was used to evaluate the
lender's liability." Most jurisdictions, however, are not clear about the
requisite elements for imposing a duty." In certain jurisdictions, a
lender that controls disbursement automatically becomes an agent and
fiduciary of the borrower." Other jurisdictions are not so quick to
judge.'" Furthermore, one jurisdiction that nposed a duty on the
lender was still unclear about the scope of the duty.'37
Nonetheless, in order to protect itself from the uncertainty surround-
mg the issue, a lender should adhere to certain basic guidelines when
disbursing construction loan proceeds.
IV How A LENDER CAN PROTECT ITSELF FROM CLAIMS OF
IMPROPER DISBURSEMENT OF LOAN PROCEEDS
Several practical measures can be taken by a lender to avoid liability
for the improper disbursement or misapplication ofconstnction loan proceeds.
each party had independent and distinct interest"; thus, absent an "express agreement by which the
lender undertook certain obligations, there would be no liability).
IN Id. at 554.
127 Id.
rn See supra notes 82-127 and accompanying text.
I See Garbish, 517 A.2d at 553 (distingashing cases in which mortgagee and mortgagor jointly
participated m disbursement of construction funds).
" See supra notes 82-111 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
.. 737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1987).
See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19, 82-93 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 19-23, 112-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-111 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
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Obviously, the best safeguard, though usually the most difficult
to achieve, is to prevent quantity or quality defects from arsing in the
first place. The lender cannot simply rely on the borrower to protect
the lender's primary interest in repayment of the loan. The lender
should closely monitor the disbursement of the loan proceeds and the
progress of the construction project for its own benefit."
The lender also must be aware of the creditworthiness and
construction or development experience of the borrower. The lender
should be alert for developers or contractors with bad reputations or
financial difficulties. 39 The lender should communicate with the
borrower on a regular basis to keep abreast of any new information
concerning the construction loan or project. Records of such commun-
ications should be preserved.
The lender should always include an exculpatory clause or merger
clause in the loan agreement and any subsequent agreements between
the lender and the borrower." ° Exculpatory clauses are generally
valid unless contrary to public policy 141 As long as the terms of the
exculpatory clause are unambiguous and conspicuously written in the
contract, such a clause will be enforced." The lender should
specifically exculpate itself from any obligation to inspect or monitor
the construction project. This exculpatory clause should include
language stating that any inspections the lender does perform are
" Construction lenders must protect their own interests and ensure that the building or
construction project, which is customarily their primary source of collateral, is properly completed
so that it may be sold or leased. See generally Richard D. Jones, How to Spot Constnircon Warning
Signs, 1986 ABA BANKING J. 100 (listing nine danger signals to help save a construction loan before
it is too late); Donald H. Piser, Lending Management Vital to Constrction Completion: Controlling
Costs, Quality, Overruns Can Save on Loan Losses, AM. BANKER, Oct 12, 1982, at 27 (discussing
the importance of external construction loan management before and during the lending process).
... In the lender's analysis of whether a developer or contractor is experiencing financial
difficulties, it is very important to determine whether the developer or contractor has more than one
company or project underway at the same time. Should these other companies or projects be having
financial or cash flow problems, the developer or contractor may be tempted to divert funds to save
these other compames or projects. Thus, up-to-date financial information on these other companies
or projects is imperative.
" See Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that
section in loan contract govermng lender's duty to disburse is for lender's protection, not the
borrower's; also finding that duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract is breached only by bad
faith in performance of that contract and does not bind the lender beyond the loan agreement's terms);
Davis v. Nevada Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 503, 505 (Nev. 1987) (holding that although exculpatory
clauses may relieve a lender of specific contractual duties, the lender cannot disavow duties uiplied
at law and independent of the contract); Henry v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 459 A.2d 772, 775
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that the unambiguous language of the lending contract disclaimed any
duty on the part of the lender to inspect for construction deficiencies).
141 Se, e.g., Merritt v. Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Teni. CL App. 1980)
("When the terms of a written instrument are unambiguous, the mterpretation of the contract is a
matter of law for the court," and the general rule is that exculpatory clauses are valid.).
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solely for the lender's benefit"'3 If the lender insists on disbursing the
loan proceeds directly to the builder, the same sort of exculpatory
language should be included in the loan agreement.'"
Because several jurisdictions have imposed upon the lender a higher
duty or standard of care where the lender disburses the loan funds directly
to the third party builder,14 5 disbursement of the loan proceeds directly
to the borrower is another safeguard the lender might wish to take.
However, most jurisdictions will not impose a duty on the lender if the
lender requires prior or concurrent approval from the borrower for
disbursing funds to the builder." Therefore, where the lender does
control the disbursement, it is important to obtain and document the
borrower's written approval of the funding of each construction draw
request.47
The lender should also require the borrower to protect itself against
quality or quantity defects in some other way, such as through the
purchase of a surety or contract completion bond.'" This may provide
the borrower an alternative form of protection: instead of pursuing the
lender for redress of his grievances, the borrower may look to the surety
company.
Although this list of safeguards is by no means complete, a point
worth reemphasizing is the importance of preserving all documentation,
including correspondence with the borrower and third parties, relating to
the construction project.49 Should the lender find itself in court defend-
mg a claim that it misapplied loan proceeds or breached its duty to ensure
completion of a construction project free of any quantity or quality
defects, proper documentation of the loan arrangement, including the
express written exculpatory provisions,"s will be invaluable.
CONCLUSION
Most jurisdictions have rejected the argument that a construction
lender has a duty to inspect the borrower's construction project for the
,"See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
U See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
,,See supra notes 82-111 and accompanying text.
,7 See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
"' See Davis v. Nevada Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 503, 506 n.2 (Nev. 1987) (addressing the loan
contract in terms of the fiducary duty but expressing no opuuon as to the legal effect of the contract
language requing the borrower to secure some sort of contract completion bond). Surety bonds "are
common in the context of construction contracts where the surety guaranties to the owner that
construction will be completed (perfornance bond) and that subcontractors and suppliers will be paid
(paynent bond)." JoNATHON A. EDDY & PrER WINswP, CoMMERciL TRANsAcriONS 66 (1985).
"' Ths includes all draw request forms with the borrower's approval evidenced by the borrower's
signature.
W See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
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borrower's benefit. 5' Likewise, most courts have refused to hold the
lender responsible for ensuring the proper application of the loan
proceeds for the completion of a defect-free project.52 However, a few
jurisdictions have held that the lender may have an Implied duty to
inspect for the borrower's benefit."
The minority and those jurisdictions that have not yet encountered the
"for whose benefit" issue must realize that a lender's duty is to protect the
assets of its shareholders and depositors, not those of its borrowers."5
"[I]f our financial institutions are to remain solvent [it is most important]
to prevent a conventional money lender from having to insure every
business venture. This policy is particularly necessary in the construction
lending business where risks are so great."'"
Moreover, lenders do not have the "specialized, technical competence
to act as builders," and when they do not represent to borrowers that they
have such expertise, it is unreasonable to require them "to acquire such
competence ,I' Under such circumstances the lender would be
unnecessarily duplicating the role of the developer-borrower. Conse-
quently, the increased cost of financing, due to the lender's additional
obligation, would merely be passed on to the developer-borrower.'"
An equally important concern is determining the duty and standard
of care a lender owes the borrower when the lender disburses the
construction loan proceeds directly to the builder." Absent an express
agreement to the contrary or unusual circumstances, 59 the theory that
the lender that disburses loan proceeds directly to the builder thereby
becomes an implied agent and/or fiduciary of the borrower"' ° is much
too severe. Although the additional duties this theory imposes upon the
lender can be avoided if the lender disburses the loan proceeds to the
borrower, disbursement directly to the builder provides some benefits to
the lender.
Courts must recognize that the lender disburses directly to the builder
for its own administrative convemence and for its own benefit. The lender
See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-60, 82-111 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 61-69, 75-78 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 112-27 and
accompanying text.
114 See Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d 230, 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
" Fox & Carskadon Fin. Corp. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 52 Cal. App. 3d 484,
488 (Cal. CL App. 1975).
"" See Butts, 262 S.E.2d at 233.
157 rd.
" Tins applies to any other duty that a court might urpx upon a lender beyond the general
reasonable care standard.
1- See supra notes 21, 39-44, 72, 118-27 and accompanying text (illustrating situations that may
justify the imposition of a higher duty of care upon the lender).
1- See supra notes 19-23, 63-64, 75, 112-17 and accompanying text.
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is merely ensuring that the loan proceeds are used solely for the purpose
of funding construction costs. If the lender follows the terms of the
construction loan agreement, the lender should only be obligated to
exercise reasonable care in disbursing the appropriate amount to the
builder. No additional duty or igher standard of care should be imposed.
Even without the borrower's pnor approval of each draw request, the duty
of care owed by the lender should be limited to the standard of reason-
able care.
The lender is the financier, not the insurer, of the construction project.
Any extra duty nposed upon the lender only increases the costs of
financing. The lender merely provides the funds, and any extra steps are
undertaken strictly to protect its interest in repayment. Several jurisdic-
tions have confused the lender's duty to the borrower with the lender's
duty to its shareholders."" To reduce this confusion, courts must
recognize that clains that attempt to inpose upon the lender a duty to
inspect the construction project or to ensure the proper application of the
loan proceeds are frivolous and unsound; where the lender adheres to the
terms of the construction loan agreement and makes no unusual demands
or representations, courts must dismiss such claims for fiilure to state a
claun or must grant summary judgment in favor of the lending
institution. 63
Douglas C. Franck
." See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
. Where no duty is present, a valid claim cannot be stated. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
' Where no duty exists, as a matter of law, summary judgment must be granted even if a
material fact is in dispute. See, e.g., Light v. Equitable Mortage Resources, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 142 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989); Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); Henry
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 459 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). See generally FED. R. Civ. P.
1992-931

